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Do Parents Matter?  
Effects of Lender Affiliation through the Mortgage Boom and Bust
Claudine Gartenberg 
NYU Stern School of Business, 40 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012, 
cgartenb@stern.nyu.edu 
It is widely acknowledged that the 2007 mortgage crisis was preceded by a broad deterioration in 
underwriting diligence. This paper shows that this deterioration varied by the industry affiliation of 
mortgage lenders. Loans issued by homebuilders and standalone lenders were significantly less likely to 
default than loans issued by depository banks and affiliates of major financial institutions. I argue that 
homebuilders and standalone lenders had the least financial capacity to hold mortgages, and their 
resulting need to sell loans quickly on the secondary market forced them to issue safer loans. Tests of 
other explanations, including differences in information and incentives to avoid foreclosure externalities, 
receive little support. This study highlights a novel means by which firm boundaries influence firm 
adaptation to changing market conditions, by defining the boundaries of the internal capital markets and 
hence the relative constraints of constituent units.  
Key words: Corporate finance; Financial institutions; banks; Organization studies; Strategy; Industrial 
organization; Firm objectives, Organization and behavior; Real estate 
History: First submitted January 10, 2012, final version: February 20, 2014. 
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1. Introduction
One of the precursors to the housing crisis that began in 2007 was a sharp decrease in mortgage
underwriting quality earlier in the 2000s (Demyanyk and Van Hemert 2011; Dell’Ariccia et al. 2009).
Despite substantial research on the underlying factors that led to this lending deterioration (e.g., Mian and
Sufi 2009; Rajan et al. 2012; Keys et al. 2010), the role of mortgage lenders has received relatively little
attention. Aside from exploring the effects of vertical disintegration and the corresponding decline of
“skin in the game” (Demiroglu and James 2012; Purnanandam 2011), studies generally assume lenders to
be relatively homogeneous. This, however, is far from the case. All major depository banks had lending
units during the period in question, as did major investment banks, many insurance companies and
national homebuilders. The heterogeneity of parent industries raises the question: How did these units’
corporate affiliations affect lending quality during this period? The answer to this question is relevant not
only for isolating underlying causes for the housing downturn, but also for addressing a long-standing
question in corporate strategy: How do firm boundaries influence how firms adapt to changing external
conditions?
This latter question has led to a large and active research agenda. Recent studies have typically 
adopted a transactions cost (Williamson 1975, 1985) or capability development (Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 
1986) approach to the question. A small sample of these studies reveals that firm boundaries influence 
complex problem solving (Macher 2006), coordination in uncertain and changing environments (Forbes 
and Lederman 2009) and capability development in general (Jacobides and Winter 2006). Other studies 
emphasize the darker side of integration as leading to coordination costs (Rawley 2010; Rawley and 
Simcoe 2010; Zhou 2011) and agency or social conflicts (Pierce 2012; Nickerson and Zenger 2008). This 
study, in contrast, suggests a less-explored means by which firm boundaries affect adaptation—through 
their impact on the relative financial resources and constraints of constituent units. 
In the popular view, there is a widespread presumption that lending quality did, in fact, vary by 
type of parent affiliation. Homebuilders, which sold nearly 30% of new homes in the U.S during the 
2000s and financed up to 70-80% of these homes, have been subject to several consumer and shareholder 
lawsuits, as well as government investigations accusing them of engaging in particularly poor lending 
practices to sell more homes.1,2 Furthermore, during this period of unprecedented home sales and price 
1 Homebuilders comprised an even larger market share in boom geographies, financing 51% of all new homes in Phoenix and 
47% in Las Vegas. While mortgages for new homes comprise less than 10% of the total residential mortgage market in the US, 
the residential construction industry accounts for approximately 4-5% of U.S. GDP (source: bipartisanpolicy.org, “Bonfire of the 
Homebuilders,” Businessweek, August 13, 2007 and author’s estimates from 10-K filings and mortgage database) 
2 Some cases include: In Re: Beazer Homes USA, Inc . Securities Litigation, Master File No: 1:07-cv-725-CC; Mark Zachary v. 
Countrywide Home Loans Inc. and Countrywide KB Home Loans; Sodalin Kaing v. Pulte Homes, C09-05057; See, also, HUD 
Audit Reports 2009-LA-1018, 2006-LA-1014, 2006-LA-1001, as well as SEC and Department of Justice investigations into 
Beazer Homes. 
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appreciation, homebuilders’ share of new home mortgages grew relative to other lenders’ (see Figure 1a). 
This increased share suggests that homebuilders were “buying deep” into the risk pool to sustain sales 
growth, particularly as sales began to level off in late 2005 and 2006 (see Figure 1b). In fact, in the 
aftermath of the collapse, homebuilder mortgages defaulted at roughly 130-150% of the national 
average.3 This poor performance appears to confirm popular accounts and support prior models of captive 
finance that explain lower lending quality by in-house lenders as efficient cross-subsidization of the 
durable good (Barron et. al. 2008). 
<< INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE >> 
This study disputes this interpretation. It finds that the higher default rate of homebuilder loans is 
entirely attributable to the concentration of new construction in particularly risky geographies and, in fact, 
controlling for geographic factors, homebuilders applied significantly more diligence than other lenders. 
Using a dataset of 212,058 mortgages issued by all market participants in the 100 zip codes that 
experienced the most new home construction from January 1999 to mid-2009, I evaluate lending quality 
as the hazard of loan default after controlling for macroeconomic, borrower-risk and contract 
characteristics. I compare the default hazard across four classes of lenders: homebuilders, standalone 
lenders, depository banks and lenders affiliated with large financial institutions. Rather than 
underperforming the market, homebuilder loans perform significantly better than similar loans issued by 
depository banks and affiliates of large financial institutions. Interestingly, these quality differences 
emerge only with the peaks of the housing boom in 2005 and 2006. The relative hazard of mortgage 
default for loans issued by depository banks increased from being statistically indistinguishable from that 
of homebuilders’ loans between 1999 to 2004 to being 36% higher in 2005 and 2006.  
I explore three potential explanations for this finding. First, I ask whether financial constraints 
explain lending quality differences. In this scenario, firms with more constrained capacity to hold loans, 
including homebuilders and most standalone mortgage banks, underwrote mortgages that could be sold 
quickly and with a lower chance of forced repurchases due to poor underwriting quality.4 The second 
explanation focuses on information differences between lenders. Here, homebuilders produce more soft 
information about customers and local market conditions as a byproduct of their home sales and land 
operations. They use this information to screen customers more thoroughly and to respond better to 
imminent downturns in their local markets. The third explanation asks whether homebuilders’ 
internalization of the costs of foreclosures in their subdivisions—costs that other lenders do not bear—
drives higher lending standards. 
3 Source: CoreLogic 
4 Forced repurchases arise from early default, violation of stated underwriting guidelines or fraud—all of which increase with 
poor underwriting.  
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Overall, I find support for the first explanation and no strong evidence for the second or third. 
Specifically, the hazard of loan default, conditional on a loan’s observable characteristics, is positively 
related to the average loan holding period for a firm and to a supplementary pricing-related proxy for 
mortgage holding capacity. This proxy is defined as the degree to which the hard information on a loan 
explains loan prices. The logic behind this measure follows Rajan et al. (2013), who show that as 
securitization levels increased, loan pricing was increasingly explained by hard information. Taken 
together, I interpret these results as evidence that markets did, in fact, exert a disciplining force at the 
height of the boom, particularly for lenders with limited loan-holding capacity.5  
These findings suggest an interesting and previously unexplored relationship between internal 
capital markets and firm adaptation. One defining feature of internal capital markets is that managers 
engage in “winner-picking,” allocating capital to units at levels above what would be available via the 
external market (Williamson 1975; Donaldson 1984). Stein (1997) also demonstrates that, in order to 
provide capital to winners, managers must engage in so-called “loser-sticking”: undersupplying capital to 
other units, even if those units have profitable investment opportunities. A given unit, therefore, may be 
resource-constrained within one firm and resource-rich in another, solely as a function of the other 
opportunities within the firm boundaries. These constraints, in turn, influence how the firm adapts to 
changing conditions.  
In the housing context, the findings are consistent with homebuilders’ mortgage units being 
“loser-stuck,” particularly as the housing boom progressed and headquarters allocated an increasing share 
of capital to housing operations. The findings further suggest that these “loser-stuck” units and other 
constrained lenders responded to market growth with relatively more discipline than unconstrained 
lenders.  
For integrated homebuilders, this result is counterintuitive, as prior research on captive lending 
and lender segmentation predicts that the mortgage units might optimally lower their screening levels in 
order to subsidize housing units (Barron et al 2008) or as they specialize (Carey et al 1998; Remonola and 
Wulfekuhler 1992). The results of this paper show the opposite, that homebuilders both served observably 
                                                            
5 These findings are consistent with statements from industry participants interviewed for this study. For example, a former head 
of the mortgage affiliate of one of the largest national homebuilders stated during an interview: “There is a stereotype that 
securitization led to this hot potato, that’s where the risk was. In reality . . . the opposite was true. It was the portfolio lenders, 
including the securitization issuers, who went out like riverboat gamblers. If I am a bank, I can put $8 billion into a new product 
tomorrow. If I rely on the market [to fund mortgages], there’s only so quickly it can adapt to new products. The market was a 
well-oiled machine and relied on known products. Anything new was done in-house. . . . [W]e never originated a mortgage 
without knowing where we would place it.” The former head of the lending affiliate of another large national homebuilder made 
a similar remark when asked what drove strict underwriting standards: “We made 15-40% margin on our homes; why tie up 
capital in mortgages? We had a $100 million line, [and] we had to turn it over every 30 days to free up capital to make new 
loans.” 
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less risky segments and had higher underwriting diligence. This result also runs counter to prior research 
that has shown that integrated firms are generally less disciplined than markets (Williamson 1985).  
This research is closely related to two recent papers. Seru (2013) shows that conglomerates 
reduce R&D productivity in acquired firms, particularly in acquirers with active capital markets.6 
Lyandres (2006) suggests that conglomerates affect rival competition in product markets by requiring 
divisions to share a unified firm-wide capital structure. While the specific mechanisms differ, both these 
papers and the current study note that end-market activity is influenced by internal capital allocation that 
is in turn determined by firm boundary choice.  
This paper also makes two contributions to the large and growing literature on the causes and 
consequences of the recent housing crisis (e.g., Shiller 2008; Mayer, Pence and Sherlund 2009; Foote et 
al. 2008). First, it provides evidence that contradicts the perspective that the “originate to distribute” 
lending model, on its own, led to poor underwriting practices during this period (Purnanandam 2011, 
Demiroglu and James 2012). A high-securitization environment may, indeed, have contributed to poor 
systemic underwriting (Keys et al. 2010; Rajan et al. 2013) and exacerbated the foreclosure crisis 
(Piskorski et al. 2010). Within this environment, however, I find that firms with limited capacity to hold 
loans before selling them to third parties were more disciplined than firms with more funding options. 
Second, this paper shows that the systemic deterioration in lending quality over the course of the boom 
(Dell’Ariccia et al. 2009) was not evenly shared by originators. In fact, some of the firms that displayed 
the greatest deterioration—depository banks—were also the most regulated, a finding similar to that of 
Keys et al. (2009).  
 Lastly, this paper contributes to research on credit markets. Prior credit research outside of a 
housing context has shown that specialized lenders, which include captive industrial lenders analogous to 
the homebuilders in this paper, serve observably riskier customer segments, independent of geography, 
(Carey et al. 1998; Barron et al. 2008) and show evidence of agency issues (Pierce 2012). None of these 
findings were validated in this context; in fact, they were contradicted.  
 
2.  Mortgage industry in the 2000s 
The first half of the 2000s was marked by 100% home price appreciation between 2000 and 
2006,7 increased construction activity from 1.5 million new homes in mid-2000 to 2.3 million in early 
2006, and increased mortgage originations from $1 trillion in 2000 to $2.7 trillion in 2006.8 Concurrent 
                                                            
6 In the management literature, Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989) and Hoskisson et al. (1993) note a similar empirical finding, 
although they attribute the costs to inefficient monitoring and incentives associated with diversification, rather than internal 
capital markets. 
7 Based on both the Case-Shiller Composite 20 index and the LoanPerformance House Price Index, source: 
www.calculatedriskblog.com, accessed June 23, 2010. 
8 Source: Census Bureau. 
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with these trends was an increase in securitization, combined with an increasing reliance on pricing loans 
based on “hard information,” particularly a consumer’s FICO (credit) score (Rajan et al. 2013).9  
Beginning in 2005 and 2006, national home prices and sales both leveled off. In the first half of 
2007, the private-label (non-government-backed) securities market effectively shut down, leading to the 
failure of numerous mortgage lenders. By January 2010, national home prices had fallen 30% from their 
peak, including 55%, 50%, and 46% in Las Vegas, Phoenix, and Miami, respectively. By March 2010, 
24% of all U.S. residential properties with mortgages were worth less than the mortgages on the 
properties, including 70% of all properties in Nevada, 51% in Arizona and 48% in Florida.10 This housing 
crash triggered a financial crisis that precipitated the largest recession since the Great Depression.  
 
2.1 Mortgage origination 
The mortgage industry spans both the primary market to supply loans to consumers and the secondary 
securitization market, in which originators transfer the loans via bulk sales to third parties (or to a 
different division within the same firm) and pool them into trusts that issue mortgage-backed securities. 
For bulk sales, lenders periodically assemble a pool of loans and either offer the pool to a specific 
purchaser or place it for bid. Purchasers have two levers to ensure loan quality. First, they can “kick out” 
loans from the pool that they deem to be poor quality.11 Lenders can then attempt to re-offer kicked out 
loans to other buyers; however, these loans often take longer to place and are sold at a discount. Second, 
they can “put back” loans by forcing lenders to repurchase the loans post-sale if any representations and 
warranties in the loan purchase agreements are violated. Like kicked-out loans, these repurchased loans 
typically can be resold, but only after a period of time and often at a loss rate of approximately 25%, 
according to practitioners interviewed for this study. While no industry-wide data are available, 
practitioners report that purchaser due diligence began increasing in early 2005 as home price 
appreciation began to moderate and then dramatically increased in 2006 and 2007 as home prices leveled 
and defaults rose.12  
I categorize mortgage lenders into four parent industries used in later analyses: standalone 
mortgage lenders (such as Countrywide); depository banks (including both commercial banks such as 
Bank of America and thrifts such as Washington Mutual); mortgage lenders affiliated with larger firms 
                                                            
9 FICO stands for “Fair Isaac Corporation,” the firm that created and manages the consumer credit scoring model. 
10 Sources for this paragraph include New Century Financial Corporation Examiner’s Report, Case No. 07-10416. The Mortgage 
Lender Implode-o-Meter lists 384 lender failures since late 2006, http://ml-implode.com/, accessed June 14, 2010, Source: 
S&P/Case-Shiller via www.calculatedriskblog.com accessed May 21, 2010, CoreLogic negative equity report. 
11 For example, New Century Financial Corporation experienced a 14.95% kick-out rate by December 2006 prior to bankruptcy 
in early 2007, pg 161. 
12 The bankruptcy examiner for New Century Financial Corporation reported that, in 2005, 20-30% of the loan files in New 
Century pools would be fully examined by investors. By 2006, 30-35% of loan files had been examined, and by late 2006, some 
investors had examined every loan file. Page 163. 
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(including the lending arms of AIG, GE Capital and Lehman Brothers); and homebuilders with financing 
affiliates.  
 
2.2 Homebuilders in-house mortgage units 
Homebuilders established mortgage units beginning in the 1960s and continuing through the 
1990s. By 1999, nearly all the national and large regional homebuilders had established internal divisions 
with specialized loan officers and underwriters, while mid-sized homebuilders typically had joint ventures 
with financial institutions. These in-house units generally funded only mortgages associated with homes 
constructed by the parent homebuilder. In interviews, homebuilder executives report that the rationale for 
establishing in-house units was the desire to reduce customer dropouts during the home closing process 
by improved coordination between financing and home sales activities. 
During this period, homebuilders and most standalone mortgage lenders disposed of their loans 
on the secondary market through sales to large financial institutions. Prior to these sales, mortgages were 
funded by revolving credit lines with financial institutions. These credit lines were typically small relative 
to home sales. For example, Pulte Homes—the largest U.S. homebuilder—reported a $955 million credit 
line in 2006. With annual home sales of $14 billion, this credit line allowed for mortgages to be held for 
16 to 30 days prior to sale.13 A kickout rate of 14.95%, the level reached by New Century Financial 
Corporation in December 2006, would consume 25-40% of the line.14 
 
3.  Underwriting differences by lender affiliation 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
The primary data sources are county deed records and the Loan Performance Servicer database, 
which were merged for this study in cooperation with CoreLogic, the data provider. The county deeds 
database consists of the complete public deed filings, including all liens related to purchase, refinancing 
mortgages and notices of default and foreclosure. The Loan Performance Servicer database consists of 
mortgage servicer-provided information that covers approximately 80% of all mortgages in the United 
States and includes borrower risk information and important contract provisions.15 I supplement these two 
sources with data on the lender that was hand-collected or merged from Compustat (for public firms) and 
macroeconomic data from the Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Freddie Mac and the 
Federal Reserve Bank.  
                                                            
13 The calculation uses data reported in Pulte 10K for 2006: ($955 million credit facility *85% utilization)/($14 billion * 90% 
capture rate * 80% loan-to-value) = 29 days. Pulte reported an average of 47% utilization—common in the industry to allow for 
seasonal fluctuations—which allowed mortgages to be held for 16 days before sale. 
14 Assuming a 60-90 day placement rate. 
15 The Loan Performance Servicer database should not be confused with the commonly-used Loan Performance Securities 
database, which covers the subprime market only.  
 
 
8 
 
 
3.1.1 Variables 
The outcome variable is an indicator of whether a notice of mortgage default was filed with the county, 
together with the date of filing.16 Variables that control for macroeconomic conditions and mortgage 
features are listed in Appendix A. Lender industry categories and characteristics were hand-collected, 
merged from Compustat or generated from the mortgage data. Because of the long tail of mortgage 
lenders in the database, industry categories were assigned to a sufficient number of lenders to cover 80% 
of the loans in the database. The 270 hand-coded lenders were assigned to four categories: homebuilders 
(SIC codes 1520, 1531), depository banks (SIC codes 6020, 6021, 6022, 6035), standalone mortgage 
lenders (SIC codes 6162, 6163), and affiliated mortgage lenders (SIC codes 4213, 6141, 6159, 6172, 
6211, 6311, 6331, 6531, 6798, 7200). The four categories include 34 homebuilders, 75 depository banks, 
132 standalone mortgage lenders, 46 large affiliated mortgage lenders, and 3287 small miscellaneous 
firms. Ten of the 34 homebuilders were joint ventures with banks. Although their homebuilder 
classification was retained, a joint-venture flag was added to all specifications. Joint-venture-funded loans 
comprise 15% of all homebuilder-financed loans in the sample. The remaining firms were allocated either 
to depository banks if their names included certain search terms or to the “small miscellaneous” 
category.17, 18 
 
3.1.2 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
The sample was constructed from all county deed filings for the top 100 zip codes for new home 
construction from 1999 to 2009. The zip codes are located mainly within California, Arizona, Nevada, 
Texas and Florida, with the highest concentrations of construction in Las Vegas, Nevada and Phoenix, 
Arizona. While not a nationally representative sample, the sample spans geographies that experienced 
substantial downturns (e.g., Nevada, Arizona and Florida), as well as those that were more stable (e.g., 
Texas and North and South Carolina). In aggregate, the combined home-price index tracks the national 
home price index closely.19 Relative to a national sample, this dataset includes a higher proportion of new 
home construction and, within new homes, a higher proportion of homes sold by national homebuilders. 
                                                            
16 Conditional on the mortgage not prepaying due to resale or refinance, which are treated as non-failure exits.  
17 The depository banks also include 401 small banks with a mean (median) of 26 (17) loans that had “Bank,” “BK,” “FSB,” 
“CU,” or “FCU” in their name, contributing less than 4% of depository bank loans. These banks do not materially affect the 
empirical results. 
18 The smallest ten lenders that were coded each contributed an average of 38 loans, while the largest ten lenders contributed an 
average of 26,170 loans; therefore, the incremental contribution of each additional lender was minimal.  
19 This sample experienced an 80% rise and 33% decline between 1999 and 2009, versus the national sample’s 95% rise and 32% 
decline during the same period (source: Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index). 
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As such, the sample enables greater statistical power to compare loan quality between national 
homebuilder and financial lenders.20  
The initial deed filings were screened for new-construction purchase mortgages, which provide 
an initial sample of 779,315 mortgages originated between January 1999 and September 2009. All 
mortgages designated as corporate-owned, interfamily transfers or private party sales, and all 
condominiums, townhouses and other miscellaneous property types were then excluded. Mortgages with 
substantial missing or duplicate data (184,925 records) and FHA and VA mortgages (117,718 records) 
were also excluded.21 After these exclusions, 476,672 purchase mortgages from the county filings were 
submitted to CoreLogic to be merged with the Loan Performance Servicer database. The match rate 
between the two databases was 44%, providing a final sample of 212,058 mortgages. Overall, an analysis 
of the merged sample reveals that the data are generally unbiased for this study, although the sample is 
not fully representative of the submitted dataset. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics on the merged 
database (refer to Appendix A for variable definitions).  
 Overall, the descriptive statistics show that homebuilders generally targeted higher credit 
customers, issued mortgages with more conservative contract structures (higher proportion of fixed rate 
mortgages, lower proportion of negative amortization, interest-only and prepayment penalty clauses), and 
had lower aggregate default rates.  
<< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE >> 
3.2 Empirical approach 
I use a Cox hazard model to evaluate relative default risk between lender types. This model has several 
advantages. First, it accounts for home resales and mortgage refinancing that lead to non-default-related 
exits from the dataset. Second, it allows for the inclusion of macroeconomic controls that vary post-loan 
origination, such as local home prices and unemployment and national interest rates. Third, it makes 
more-realistic assumptions regarding distribution of residuals than a linear model and accounts for right-
censoring of the data. Lastly, it does not impose an underlying functional form on the underlying 
mortgage default rate over time.22  
I report all results as hazard ratios, equivalent to odds ratios in logistic models. Since these hazard 
ratios are exponentiated, they are non-negative, centered on 1 (rather than 0) and have a multiplicative 
                                                            
20 While not nationally representative, there is no reason to believe that lending quality patterns differ in this sample from the 
national average. Conservatively, however, the result can be interpreted as quality patterns in particularly and profitable active 
markets. 
21 FHA stands for the Federal Housing Authority and VA stands for the Veterans Administration, both government agencies. 
These mortgages were excluded for two reasons: first, FHA/VA mortgages are governed by separate regulations and, hence, 
behave differently from conventional mortgages. Most studies, unless specifically focusing on the FHA, exclude these 
mortgages. Thus, I also exclude them for comparability purposes.  
22 I replicated the analysis using a logit specification and obtained qualitatively identical results. 
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interpretation. As such, coefficients less than one represent a decrease in the relative hazard and 
coefficients greater than one represent an increase. The following model is used in the analysis:23 
0 0 1 2
3 4 5
( | ) ( )exp(
+ )
i i i i
i i year i st i i
h t x h t ParentAffiliation Macro Lender
Risk Contract Price YearFE StateFE
α β β β
β β β β β ε
= + + +
+ + + + +
,
 (1) 
where ( | )ih t x is the hazard of default of loan i at time t, conditional on the loan not being prepaid due to 
a sale or refinancing event. 0 ( )h t  is the baseline hazard. ParentAffiliation  is a vector of five indicator 
variables for homebuilders, standalone mortgage lenders, depository banks, affiliated mortgage lenders 
and miscellaneous lenders (throughout the analysis, the homebuilders are the omitted lender type unless 
otherwise specified). Macro is a vector of macroeconomic controls that includes the home price index 
constructed from repeat sales using the county deed records. Lender is a vector of lender controls; Risk
is a vector of standard hard risk metrics on the borrower; and Contract is a vector of mortgage 
characteristics. Price includes the initial interest rate of the loan for all mortgages and the margin above 
an index if the loan is an adjustable-rate mortgage. YearFE and StateFE represent vintage (origination) 
year and state fixed effects. See Appendix A for a more detailed definition of these variables.  
The set of coefficients represented by 0β  are the main parameters of interest. If homebuilders 
issued relatively worse-performing loans than other lender types, then the 0β  estimates will be less than 
1.  
 
3.3 Results 
Table 2 begins with a direct comparison of the default hazard of homebuilders and financial firms pooled 
across all years of the sample. Column (1) shows the unconditional relative hazard for the years 1999 to 
2009. This specification allows for all choices by lenders to vary, including geography, macroeconomic 
conditions, and years in which to offer loans, as well as choice of borrower risk and contract 
characteristics. The results show that, allowing for geography and vintage year to vary, homebuilder loans 
have a lower default hazard than standalone and affiliated mortgage lenders and statistically the same as 
depository banks and miscellaneous firms. Columns (2) and (3) add in “hard information” controls, 
including lender and macroeconomic controls and fixed effects for vintage years and states in Column (2) 
and observable risk and contract characteristics in Column (3). In Column (2), the hazard ratio 
coefficients on all the lender types are significantly greater than one. For example, the hazard ratio for 
loans issued by depository banks is now 2.1385, more than twice as high the baseline of 1 for 
                                                            
23 In unreported results, the findings are replicated using logit specifications. 
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homebuilder loans, the omitted category. The difference between the results in Columns (1) and (2) 
indicates that homebuilders offered mortgages in riskier geographies, years and macroeconomic 
conditions than other lenders; however, controlling for those choices, the default hazard is lower. A 
comparison of the results in Columns (2) and (3) shows that homebuilders targeted safer borrowers than 
the four financial lender types and that, conditional on that segmentation choice, the default hazard was 
lower than for financial lenders. 
 
<< INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
Column (4) includes interest rate as a proxy for “soft information.” The logic here is that any 
borrower risk that is observed by the lenders, but not captured in metrics such as FICO and combined 
loan-to-value ratio, will be reflected in the interest rates that the lender charges. 24 This model reflects the 
full specification in equation (1). The coefficients on the parent affiliation indicators all attenuate 
compared to Column (3), but they are still greater than 1 and significant. This indicates higher default 
hazard than for loans issued by homebuilders, even after controlling for loan characteristics.  
Overall, Table 2 shows that homebuilders funded mortgages in riskier areas than other lenders. 
Within these areas, however, they targeted safer borrowers and offered safer mortgage contracts. In 
addition, after controlling for these choices, they also appeared to underwrite higher-quality loans. This 
underwriting could be due either to additional screening on soft information not fully reflected in 
mortgage prices or to a treatment effect in which homebuilders place borrowers into safer loans.  
Table 3 reports relative default hazard across different time periods. I run the full specification as 
in Column (4) in Table 2, subdivided by time period. For space reasons, only 0β , the coefficient on the 
parent affiliation indicators, is reported. The table shows the results over four main time periods during 
the housing cycle: the baseline years (1999-2002), the middle boom (2003-2004), the late boom (2005-
2006) and the post boom (2007-2009).  
 
<< INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
The coefficients on parent affiliation indicators are insignificant during the 1999-2002 and 2003-
2004 periods, indicating no statistical difference in lending standards by parent affiliation for loans issued 
during those years. During 2005 and 2006, the peak housing period, the coefficients on depository banks 
and affiliated lenders increase to 1.3582 and 1.5643, significant at the 1% level. Homebuilders’ hazard 
                                                            
24 Since interest rate is both a proxy for soft information and an outcome of other independent variables in the model, there is 
some question as to whether it should be included as a control. The results in the paper are qualitatively unchanged either way. 
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remained lower than other lenders’ during the post-boom period, 2007-2009, with the coefficient on 
standalone lenders of 1.5023 and depository banks of 1.4641. Overall, the results in Tables 2 and 3 
provide evidence that lending quality did differ by parent affiliation and that these differences emerged 
only during the peak period of the housing boom, when lending standards were at their lowest level 
overall.  
 
4.  Explaining lending differences 
I investigate three explanations for these differences. First, homebuilders have more constrained 
capacity to hold mortgages from origination until secondary market sale, and this constraint led to 
increased underwriting diligence. Second, homebuilders possessed greater soft information about 
homebuyers and local geographic conditions, which enabled better screening. Third, homebuilders 
internalized the costs associated with foreclosures on proximate homes, which led to more diligent 
underwriting. I focus on the 2005-2006 period for these analyses since differences between lenders were 
insignificant between 1999 and 2004, and, from 2007 onward, lending differences are fully explained by 
firms that failed by the end of 2008, reflecting the highly abnormal industry conditions.25  
 
4.1 Constrained mortgage-holding capacity 
The argument for constrained holding capacity is as follows: Mortgage lenders use capital to fund and 
hold mortgages until the loans can be sold to third-party financial institutions. In general, institutional 
buyers have the option to reject (“kick out”) loans offered by the lender or to force the lender to 
repurchase (“put back”) loans if those loans were found to violate representations and warranties in the 
loan purchase agreements. Both actions would cause lenders to hold rejected loans until they could be 
sold. As a result, lenders with more-limited holding capacity should exert more diligence during the 
underwriting process to minimize this mortgage-holding risk. Under this scenario, homebuilders, 
following Stein’s (1997) “loser-sticking” argument, ration capital to their in-house mortgage units in 
order to provide resources to their land and construction operations, particularly during periods of high 
growth. Thus, we should observe homebuilder behavior consistent with constrained lending, especially 
during peak periods. 26 
                                                            
25 I define “failure” as an announcement closure of operations recorded by http://ml-implode.com/ or government-backed 
injection of capital. Overall, 40% of the firms coded for this analysis failed by the end of 2008, accounting for 28% of the loans 
issued after 2006. Among standalone mortgage lenders, 51% of loans issued after 2006 were underwritten by firms that failed by 
the end of 2008. The coefficient on standalone mortgage lenders is explained entirely by firms that failed by the end of 2008. 
Mortgage lenders that survived beyond 2008 have a default hazard indistinguishable from homebuilders.   
26 A question that may arise is whether homebuilders could manage the kickout problem by adjusting wholesale pricing rather 
than loan quality. Unfortunately, I do not have wholesale pricing to investigate this channel. However, it is unlikely to be a large 
factor for two reasons: first, lowering loan prices would be unlikely to speed disposition since speed was related to originator 
reputation for quality, and high prices (rather than low) signaled quality (assuming, over the long run, that high prices reflect 
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 While capital rationing is not directly observable, the reported cash flows of public builders 
provide some support for this argument. Table 4 shows the median cash flow allocated between land 
purchase, improvement and construction (“housing”) operations and the mortgage units within the eight 
public homebuilders for which data were available. The first column shows that housing operations 
consumed more cash than was generated through the internal operations of the firm, with the median cash 
flow allocated to housing across all years of the sample comprising 127% of net income. Over time, the 
allocation of cash to housing operations increased from 86% of net income at the economic trough in 
2002 to 194% in 2006. The second column shows cash flow allocated to the mortgage units, with a 
median level of 3.5% of net income, far below the levels allocated to housing operations. In contrast to 
housing cash flow, cash flow to mortgage units generally decreased over the housing cycle. In 2006, 
mortgage units consumed the cash equivalent of 7% of net income, down from 33% in 2002. The final 
column shows the ratio of cash allocated to mortgage units as a percent of cash allocated to housing 
operations, which shows the same countercyclical pattern.  
These patterns are consistent with housing operations receiving relatively more capital as the 
boom progressed (the “winners” of the internal capital markets) and mortgage units receiving relatively 
less (the “losers”) and, thus, becoming more constrained. This conclusion must be caveated as follows: 
since cash flow only measures absolute cash allocation and not allocation relative to investment 
opportunities, it is an imperfect measure of constraints. Conservatively, then, this table is consistent with, 
but not proof of, loser-sticking of the homebuilder mortgage units.  
  
<< INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
 Two challenges also exist in testing whether these constraints affected lending quality: causal 
identification and measurement of mortgage-holding capacity in a standard way across lenders with 
widely varying reporting requirements. In terms of causal identification, the ideal test would be to observe 
an exogenous shift in firms’ mortgage-holding capacities, followed by a corresponding change in lending 
quality. However, no such experiment occurred during this time period. Therefore, the relation between 
holding capacity and lending quality is associative. Any causal interpretation is based on insight from 
practitioner interviews and ruling out alternative explanations.  
Second, since I do not observe mortgage-holding capacity, I construct two measures as proxies. 
The first is a direct calculation of the average loan holding period by firm, using hand-collected data from 
public filings (SEC quarterly and annual 10-Q and 10-K filings, bank “Call Reports,” and securitization 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
quality underwriting, the focus on this test). Second, if we assume that this channel does play some role, and price effects would 
offset quality, and so we can interpret the results in Table 5 as net of any price effect. 
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prospectuses).27 The second measure is the degree to which loans are priced on observable, “hard-
information” loan characteristics such as credit scores and loan-to-value ratios. Rajan et al. (2013) show 
that, to price and purchase mortgages as the boom progressed, both securitizers and investors of 
mortgage-backed securities relied increasingly on hard (verifiable) information and less on soft 
(unverifiable) information about the borrower.28 Hard information is easy to observe and contract upon; 
therefore, mortgages underwritten and priced on hard information could be placed more quickly with 
third parties in secondary market sales. Consistent with this research, I interpret a firm’s greater reliance 
on hard information for mortgage pricing as a proxy for their intent to sell mortgages quickly on the 
secondary market.29 
This proxy—“Pricing R-squared”—is calculated by running one regression per firm of the 
mortgage price on the contract and macroeconomic characteristics described in equation (1) and 
extracting the adjusted r-squared. Because of the requirement for sufficient numbers of mortgages and 
mortgage defaults to calculate both the R-squared and the hazard by lender, only the 241 most active 
firms could be used for this analysis.  
The adjusted R-squared is extracted from running the following model for the jth firm:  
 
1
2 3 4
i j j i
j i j j i year i st i i
price Macro
Lender Risk Contract YearFE StateFE
α β
β β β β β ε
= +
+ + + + + + .
 (2) 
Following Rajan et al. (2013), I use the initial rate of the loan for the price.30 The holding-period 
measure and the explained pricing measure complement each other as proxies: The average loan holding 
period is subject to an ex post bias since the holding period may increase as loan quality decreases, while 
the explained pricing measure is unbiased by ex post performance but is, at best, an indirect proxy for 
capacity constraints.  
 
4.1 Results 
Table 5a shows the descriptive statistics for the holding-period measures. Overall, the average holding 
period for homebuilders and standalone mortgage banks is 19.12 and 28.46 days, respectively, and 44.41 
and 61.13 days for depository banks and affiliated mortgage lenders. These holding periods are 
statistically different from each other and consistent with homebuilders and standalone mortgage lenders 
                                                            
27 The details of the data gathered and the holding-period calculation can be provided on request.  
28 Examples of hard information include the controls in equation 1, while unverifiable soft information might include a loan 
officer’s assessment of an applicant’s credibility, her future employment prospects and intuition about her likelihood of 
defaulting.  
29 Another potential interpretation of this proxy is that pricing r-squared represents the degree of soft information available to the 
lender; however, that would yield the opposite prediction and is not confirmed in the data. I thank an anonymous reviewer for 
pointing this out. 
30 The results are essentially unchanged when I rerun this analysis with only adjustable-rate mortgages and use the margin 
charged over the floating index once the teaser period expires.  
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funded by limited credit lines. Table 5a also shows summary statistics for the Pricing R-squared measure. 
The reasonably high negative correlation (-0.4071) between the mortgage holding period and pricing R-
squared provides some confirmation that these measures, calculated from different sources and spanning 
different subsamples, capture similar underlying factors. 
 
<< INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
Table 5b presents the association between the mortgage holding period and relative default hazard. 
Column (1) shows the relative hazard by parent affiliations for the subset of firms for which the mortgage 
holding period was available. This subsample covers 72% of the mortgages issued for coded (non-
miscellaneous) lenders between 2005 and 2006 and includes public homebuilders and mortgage lenders, 
federally regulated banks and firms that issued securitizations during the period.31 Column (2) shows a 
significant association between the mortgage holding period and default hazard, with an increase in the 
holding period from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile associated with a 28% increase in default 
hazard.  
Column (3) presents one of the main results of this paper. It includes both holding-period and 
parent affiliation indicators and shows that the holding period explains the differences in the relative 
default hazard between lender types. The coefficients on the parent-affiliation indicators are now 
insignificant, while the coefficient on the mortgage holding period is 1.0064 and significant at the 1% 
level. An unreported analysis shows that the reductions in coefficients on the parent affiliation indicators 
between models (1) and (3) are statistically significant.32 Columns (4)-(6) replace the mortgage holding 
period with the Pricing R-squared measure in the same analysis.33 The point estimates and significances 
on the parent-affiliation indicators are reduced substantially when the Pricing R-Squared proxy is 
included in the models, although it does not explain all the differences between parent affiliations.34 
 Figure 2 presents results from a related analysis at the firm level, rather than at the individual- 
mortgage level. In this analysis, firm-level measures of lending hazard are calculated by replacing lender- 
affiliation indicators with individual lender identifiers in the hazard model for 2005-2006 (as shown in 
Table 3, Column 3). These firm-level hazard measures are plotted versus the two measures of holding 
capacity. The results confirm the findings in Table 5. Panel A shows a strong positive association between 
                                                            
31 The sample excludes primarily non-securitizing private standalone lenders and non-federally regulated banks.  
32 Using the suest command with a logit specification, I calculate the significance of the change in the coefficient estimates to 
have Pr>0.0398, 0.0223 and 0.0253 for standalone mortgage lenders, depository banks and affiliated mortgage lenders, 
respectively.  
33 This second subsample covers 99% of all coded (non-miscellaneous) lenders, with the bottom 1% excluded due to insufficient 
degrees of freedom in the first-stage pricing regression. 
34 Using the suest command with a logit specification, I calculate the significance of the change in the coefficient estimates to be 
Pr>0.6087, 0.1004, 0.0372 for standalone mortgage lenders, depository banks and affiliated mortgage lenders, respectively.  
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the mortgage holding period and firm-level hazard, and Panel B shows a strong negative association 
between pricing R-squared and firm-level hazard. 
 
<< INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
Overall, these analyses show that the differences in default hazard between lenders with different 
parent affiliations are explained by differences in mortgage-holding capacity, as measured both by 
mortgage holding periods and by the degree to which loans are priced on hard information.35 
 
4.2 Soft Information 
The second possible explanation for lender differences is that homebuilders possess more “soft” 
information on the quality of both the borrowers and the local real estate market as a byproduct of the 
home sales and land purchase process. They then use this information to screen borrowers more 
diligently, particularly in areas that they anticipate would be more affected by the housing downturn.36  
 This argument implies two sets of predictions. First, the difference in default hazard between 
homebuilder loans and those from other lenders should be greater within the consumer segments for 
which soft information is more important for determining default risk—that is, observably riskier 
consumer segments (Rajan et al. 2013).37 Second, the difference in default hazard between homebuilder 
loans and those from other lenders should be greater in geographies that experienced greater downturns 
after 2006 (such as Las Vegas, Phoenix and Miami, relative to Houston, for example, which experienced 
a negligible downturn in 2007). This latter prediction assumes that the broader market did not anticipate 
the severity of the downturn; therefore, homebuilders’ superior local market knowledge would benefit 
them most in the hardest-hit areas. 
 
4.2.1 Results 
The results for tests of these two predictions can be found in Table 6. For the tests of superior soft 
information about homebuyers, I calculate quartiles for three of the most common observable risk 
                                                            
35 These results at first may seem hard to reconcile with the high (13.65%) aggregated default rate of standalone mortgage 
lenders. The high default rate in Table 1 can be explained by higher concentration of these lenders in riskier geographies and 
specialization in higher credit risk customers and riskier contract structures. Once these “hard” metrics are accounted for, 
however, I find that underwriting diligence is higher than depository banks. This finding is consistent with Carey et al (1998) 
who show that specialized lenders focus on riskier segments and compensate with reputations for tougher underwriting and loan 
management. 
36 Note that we would have to make additional assumptions about homebuilders’ profit functions or secondary market sales to 
explain why they would choose to apply more diligent screens than their peers, even with free information. For simplicity, we 
assume that this is the case.  
37 In an unreported analysis, I verified the connection between soft information and observable risk directly by regressing price 
versus observables by FICO decile and find that the r-squared for the lowest (riskiest) decile is 0.1537, while the r-squared for the 
highest (least risky) decile is 0.3048. 
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measures—FICO score, combined loan-to-value ratio and interest rate—with higher quartiles indicating 
higher risk.38 These quartile indicators are then interacted with the homebuilder affiliate indicator. If 
homebuilders’ use of soft information increases in riskier consumer segments, then the difference in 
relative hazard between homebuilders and all other lenders should be greater in riskier quartiles (the 
coefficients on the homebuilder*risk quartile interactions should be less than one and significant for 
higher-risk quartiles). The results can be seen in Columns (1)-(3).39 None of the interaction variables is 
significant in Columns (1) and (3). In Column (2), the interactions are greater than one and significant, 
indicating that homebuilder loans were particularly safer in the lowest (safest) quartile of CLTV. While 
this result is the opposite of our prediction, the interactions in the second, third and fourth quartiles are not 
significantly different from each other, indicating no clear relationship between risk and decreased 
relative hazard between homebuilders and financial lenders.  
 
<< INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
 To test for superior local real estate market knowledge, I measure the difference between peak 
home prices and the subsequent trough post-2006 in each county of the analysis, using the home price 
index constructed from chained home sales reported in the county deed data. As peak-to-trough distance 
increases, the difference in relative default hazard between homebuilders and other lenders should 
increase if homebuilders anticipated the downturn better than their competitors. As with the prior tests, I 
produce quartiles of the peak-to-trough measure and create interactions with the homebuilder indicator. 
The results are reported in Column (4). As with the CLTV result in Column (2), the interactions are 
greater than one and significant, indicating that builder loans were particularly safer in the least-risky 
geographies. However, also like Column (2), the interactions in the second, third and fourth quartiles are 
not significantly different from each other, indicating no clear relationship between risk and decreased 
relative hazard between homebuilders and financial lenders. In short, unlike the prediction for this test, I 
do not observe any divergence in the hazard ratio between homebuilders and financial lenders as risk 
quartile increases. 
The discussion above must include the caveat that the null results may be a function of the test 
design and measures used. An ideal test, such as the random assignment of soft information across 
lenders, did not occur in this context. Conservatively, therefore, the results of these tests do not support 
soft-information explanations, but they do not rule them out. 
 
                                                            
38 Consequently, the FICO quartiles are reverse-scored. 
39 The difference in the sample size in Column (1) reflects the fact that the FICO score was not available for all mortgages. 
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4.3 Foreclosure externalities 
Another explanation for higher lending quality is that homebuilders lent more safely because they 
internalized the costs of foreclosures within their subdivisions, and other lenders did not. Since World 
War II, the majority of new homes have been constructed within residential subdivisions that can include 
thousands of homes (Duany et al. 2000). These subdivisions may require multiple years or decades to sell 
completely and can have high construction density, so homebuilders assume substantial land and home 
inventory risk that increases as foreclosures increase in the area. Since financial lenders are not pre-
committed to subdivisions, they do not internalize these foreclosure costs. The cost of foreclosure 
externalities has been shown to be quite large: Campbell et al. (2011) estimate a 1% reduction on the 
prices of homes within 0.05 miles of a foreclosure and effects up to 0.25 miles.  
I develop two predictions based on Campbell et al.’s (2011) result. First, within subdivisions, 
foreclosures of homes sold earlier in the lifecycle should be costlier to homebuilders than homes sold later 
since they affect demand and prices on a greater number of future homes. All else equal, therefore, 
homebuilders should be relatively more diligent with earlier sales than with later sales. This test assumes 
that homebuilders have foreknowledge of the construction life cycle within a subdivision.40 Second, the 
cost of foreclosures should be relatively greater in more densely constructed subdivisions. Therefore, 
homebuilders’ relative lending diligence should be greater in those subdivisions, while these patterns 
should not be observed in financial lenders.  
To test these predictions, I compute order and density measures using census block groups as a 
proxy for subdivisions, which cannot be observed. Census block groups are an intermediate measure 
between census tracts and census blocks, the smallest unit used by the U.S. Census that can map to 
individual street blocks. These measures are calculated on a pre-merged database of 697,456 loans in 
order to increase the number of observations within each census block group.41 Each zip code contains a 
median of thirteen census block groups.  
I construct a measure of the order of loans issued by the lender in a given census block group 
over the sample period, normalized from 0 (earliest) to 1 (latest). I then create the density measure as the 
sum of all mortgages in a census block group for a given lender over the sample period.42 Finally, I 
calculate quartiles of these measures and create interactions with the homebuilder indicator. The 
prediction is that the differences in relative hazard between homebuilders and financial firms should be 
                                                            
40 This assumption seems reasonable in this context since homebuilders’ community development plans typically include detailed 
development schedules of the subdivisions, including multiple development phases that span years and assign sites of future 
homes to specific phases.  
41 This pre-merged database includes mortgages that include conventional, FHA/VA loans for new construction single family and 
multifamily homes and condos.  
42 Note this is not a perfect measure of density since not all census block groups are the same geographic size. However, given 
the exurban composition of the dataset, I assume that it is a reasonable proxy.  
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greater in earlier and denser quartiles; therefore, the coefficients on the interactions between homebuilder 
and earlier and denser quartiles should be less than one and significant.  
As a robustness test, I also use a subsample of mortgages that includes only homes constructed by 
homebuilders with lending units. I then recreate order and density measures by construction order and 
density rather than by lending order and density. This approach arguably controls for more subdivision 
unobservables in exchange for fewer observations.  
 
4.3.1 Results 
Table 7 shows the results of these tests. In Column (1), none of the interactions between 
homebuilder and lending order is significant, suggesting that concern for future foreclosures does not 
drive safer earlier lending practices by homebuilders. Similarly, in Column (2), the interactions between 
homebuilder and lending density are significant and greater than one, suggesting that homebuilder loans 
had the lowest relative default hazard in the least-dense census block groups, the opposite of our 
prediction. However, the interactions between homebuilder and the second, third and fourth quartiles are 
not significantly different from each other, indicating that there is not a strong relationship between 
lending density and lower relative hazard between homebuilders and financial lenders. Column (3) and 
(4) show no significant interactions between homebuilders and order or density.  
 
<< INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE >> 
 
Similar to the caveat for the test for soft information, I cannot rule out that the null result in these 
tests is due to the test design and measures used. One issue is that subdivision density is non-random and 
unobserved attributes of these subdivisions may cause results that cancel out this test.43 An ideal test to 
identify this channel would involve randomization of the expected costs of foreclosure externalities, 
potentially by reassigning land and homes under construction within the same subdivision to other 
developers. These types of treatments are not particularly realistic, but without them, the results of the 
actual tests performed do not provide causal identification. Conservatively, therefore, they do not support 
foreclosure externalities as drivers of lending restraint, but they do not rule them out. 
 
5.  Other possible explanations  
There are several other possible explanations for differences between lenders. One possibility is 
that depository banks were subject to additional regulation requiring them to devote a certain percentage 
                                                            
43 For example, if homebuilder inventory is greater relative to demand in denser subdivisions, then homebuilders may have a 
greater incentive to screen consumers less diligently in these divisions in order to move inventory. 
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of their mortgage portfolio to low-income consumers and that these loans drove the differences between 
banks and other lenders. In fact, the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 has been shown to lead to 
poor-quality loans by banks (Agarwal et al. 2012). However, this regulation is unlikely to have influenced 
the results in this study since the sample consists of high-growth suburban and exurban zip codes that 
probably did not include many CRA loans. As a check, unreported analysis shows that lending 
differences do not diminish when excluding the bottom of the home-price distribution, the segment most 
likely to include CRA loans. 
 A second possible explanation is that banks and affiliated mortgage banks had access to lower- 
cost funds than other lenders, enabling them to lend to relatively riskier consumers profitably. This 
explanation, however, is inconsistent with the time history in the federal funds effective rate over the 
study period. The federal funds effective rate steadily declined from a high of 6.53% in June 2000 to 
0.99% in March 2004 and then increased from 5.23 to 5.24% between July 2006 and August 2007. If 
lower cost of available federal funding to banks drove relatively worse lending, we would expect to see 
relatively worse bank lending during the earlier period in the sample, followed by a relative increase in 
banks’ lending standards as the fed funds rate increased in 2004. We observe the opposite. 
 A third possible explanation is that multiproduct pricing by homebuilders drives differences in 
loan outcomes. While mortgage/home cross-subsidization is quite plausible in this context, it is unlikely 
to lead to the results in this paper (i.e., safer homebuilder loans, conditional on observables). First, we 
would have to believe that homebuilders used the housing operations to subsidize mortgage lending rather 
than the reverse, which is not plausible in this context.44 Second, unreported results show that 
homebuilders actually offered lower loan rates than financial lenders, which is inconsistent with the 
multiproduct pricing alternative and consistent with more-conservative screening.  
 A final possible explanation is that homebuilders show more forbearance than other lenders in 
filing notices of default. However, given that servicing rights were typically sold at the same time as the 
mortgage, this explanation would not explain differences in default rates.  
 
6.  Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper shows that loan quality during the years preceding the 2007 housing crisis was, in fact, 
related to the mortgage lenders’ parent affiliation. Lending standards of homebuilders and standalone 
mortgage lenders deteriorated significantly less than those of depository banks and mortgage lenders 
affiliated with large financial institutions. This result is surprising for several reasons. It is contrary to 
prior models and empirical studies of captive finance (Barron et al. 2008; Pierce 2012). Also, both 
                                                            
44 That is, we would have to believe that homebuyers would accept lower home sale prices or other in-kind benefits on the home 
in exchange for worse loan terms and higher loan rates. 
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homebuilders and standalone mortgage lenders are “originate to distribute” lenders; that is, they originate 
loans with no intent to retain them on their balance sheets and, therefore, have little “skin in the game.” 
Prior research has suggested that having little skin in the game encouraged lenders to underwrite poor- 
quality loans (Demiroglu and James 2012; Purnanandam 2011). 
To understand this result, I investigate three possible explanations and find evidence consistent 
with one—namely, that lenders with limited mortgage-holding capacity engaged in higher screening than 
less-constrained lenders. I argue that constrained lenders were particularly affected by market diligence 
since even a moderate level of mortgage rejections by institutional buyers could absorb already scarce 
capacity and impair their ability to issue new loans. The analysis supports this explanation: the inclusion 
of mortgage holding capacity proxies in the main specification is sufficient to explain the default hazard 
differences between lenders. Furthermore, moving from the 10th to 90th percentile in mortgage-holding 
capacity is associated with a 28% increase in loan default hazard. The constraints explanation is also 
consistent with reported cash flows within homebuilders. As the housing boom progressed, homebuilders 
allocated relatively more capital to housing operations and less to mortgage units. These cash flow 
patterns are in turn consistent with practitioner interviews who stated that they allocated as little cash to 
lending as possible in order to invest as much capital as possible into land and construction during this 
period. I also investigate whether differences in access to soft information or incentives to avoid 
foreclosures explain lending quality differences and find no evidence in support of either factor.  
This study has several limitations. First, mortgage unit constraints cannot be measured directly, 
given the diversity of firms and reporting requirements in the sample. Therefore, the study relies on 
proxies for the analysis. Second, formal causal identification cannot be established: the tests for lending 
constraints is correlative and so the research design relies on ruling out alternative explanations. This 
design presents two related challenges: loan quality, interest rates and mortgage holding period may be 
simultaneously determined by an unobserved factor and therefore the causal chain presented in the paper 
may not be valid. Also, the null findings from tests of these alternatives may be a function of the tests 
rather than evidence of the absence of effect in this setting. In fact, it is entirely plausible that multiple 
factors affecting lending may have been simultaneously present in this setting. Lastly, while the evidence 
is consistent with the mortgage units’ becoming increasingly constrained over time, the available data do 
not enable a direct test of constraints.  
 Despite these challenges, the findings of this study have implications for both strategic 
management and corporate finance. Specifically, the results suggest an interesting relationship among 
firm boundaries, internal capital markets and strategic adaptation that merits further exploration. I 
speculate on the relationship as follows: A well-known feature of internal capital markets, as discussed by 
Stein (1997), is that managers “winner-pick” projects; that is, they direct funds to divisions of their choice 
 
 
22 
 
above levels available from external markets. A necessary, but less-explored, consequence of winner-
picking is what Stein (1997) calls “loser-sticking.” That is, to fund winners, managers must withhold 
funds from other projects, even if those projects are NPV-positive and would otherwise be funded by 
external markets. Since firm boundaries define the set of projects that are ranked relative to each other, 
boundaries influence whether a business unit (equivalent to a project for this discussion) is well-funded or 
resource constrained. Resource constraints, in turn, drive different behavior in end markets, including 
how firms adapt to shifts in the external environment.  
In this study, although the association cannot be observed directly, evidence from public 
homebuilders’ cash-flow statements supports the idea that mortgage units were “loser-stuck” during this 
period: As the housing boom progressed, the mortgage units received a decreasing proportion of cash 
relative to the housing operations. Furthermore, unreported analyses show that mortgage units received a 
lower share of cash relative to housing operations as homebuilders’ revenue and earnings increased. I 
propose that, as the boom progressed and these units received fewer resources, they responded by 
exerting relatively more diligence than their less-constrained financial counterparts.  
The findings of this paper suggest a larger research agenda on the effects of firm scope on 
internal capital and labor markets. To the extent that we can interpret looser diligence as evidence of 
agency problems within firms, then loser-sticking may mitigate these issues by exposing firms to greater 
market discipline. Aside from greater discipline, loser-sticking may have other consequences for firm 
adaption. For example, it may influence how these secondary units innovate, choose their product lines or 
otherwise respond to competition. Firm scope may also have effects on internal labor markets analogous 
to those on capital markets, with “loser” units attracting different talent than would be available to 
otherwise identical non-integrated units, or “winner” units, in different firms. Winner-picking may also 
have similar-magnitude effects on adaptation.  
In sum, this research proposes a different approach to Coase (1937)’s question on the nature of 
firms and markets. By applying the concept of “winners” and “losers” in internal capital (or labor) 
markets to organizational strategy, the paper speculates that firm boundaries matter because they affect 
not only transaction costs and property rights, but also resource endowments. Given the primary focus of 
this research on explaining the main empirical result of lending differences between firms, confirmation 
of this proposition is left for future research.  
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Figure 1a: Market share of new home purchase mortgages   Figure 1b: Number of new home purchase mortgages underwritten by each 
lender type by year.     lender type by year. 
    
 
Figure 2: Firm-level hazard of mortgage default by measures of mortgage holding period.  
   
 Notes: See Table 5a for mortgage holding descriptive statistics. The left-hand figure shows hazard versus calculated mortgage holding period. The 
right-hand figure shows hazard versus the r-squared of a firm-by-firm regression of pricing on observable mortgage characteristics (see equation 2). 
Hazard is calculated by extracting the coefficient on a firm dummy in a specification that replaces firm dummies for lender type dummies in equation 
1. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics.  
 
  Homebuilders Standalone 
mtg lenders 
Depository 
banks 
Affiliated  
mtg lenders 
Small misc 
  n=74,262 n=44,550 n=60,657 n=8,087 n=24,502 
Mortgage amounts and prices    
 Sale amt ($) 281,602 288,060 296,932 280,088 277,779 
 Mtg amt ($) 213,353 220,912 226,681 215,453 213,428 
 Initial interest rate (%) 6.10 6.15 6.04 7.19 6.30 
 Reset spread (%) 2.56 3.14 2.78 5.25 3.32 
Borrower observable risk    
 CLTV (%) 80.64 83.35 82.98 86.27 82.45 
 FICO 723 707.8 710.9 656.3 708 
 Low or no documentation (%) 56.62 67.99 36.01 49.65 51.85 
 Back-end DTI 18.66 25.24 15.66 15.14 15.97 
Product type    
 ADJ (%) 11.65 17.27 20.98 27.96 16.42 
 Fix (%) 76.53 63.66 67.19 32.56 75.09 
 Hyb (%) 11.43 17.49 8.94 20.08 5.86 
 Bal (%) 0.39 1.58 2.9 19.4 2.63 
Contract terms    
 Negative amortization (%) 5.44 14.76 7.77 1.6 9.22 
 Interest only (%) 21.96 27.35 17.65 34.95 16.1 
 Prepayment penalty (%) 5.45 22.04 13.59 50.89 17.65 
Geographic distribution    
 % loans from bubble states (AZ, CA, FL, NV) 57.79 43.56 50.88 49.93 41.77 
Loan Performance    
 Notice of default (%) 7.86 13.65 7.89 21.76 9.2 
Lender characteristics    
 Log annual number loans 2,833 2,994 1,766 440 111 
 Lender independent (%) 0 98.63 59.03 3.98 100 
 Parent public (%) 92.01 38.7 96.54 86.84 0 
 Lender JV with bank (%) 14.96     
Notes: See Appendix A for variable definitions  
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Table 2: Hazard of mortgage default, 1999-2009 
  Hazard Ratio 
 
Dependent variable:  
Mortgage default Unconditional Geo only 
Geo, risk, 
contract 
Geo, risk,  
contract, pricing 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Parent Affiliation     
 Standalone mortgage lenders 1.5672** 2.6829*** 1.2519* 1.1984* 
  (2.0680) (4.1683) (1.8884) (1.7730) 
 Depository banks 0.9784 2.1385*** 1.3586*** 1.3317*** 
  (-0.1301) (3.4760) (2.8779) (2.9521) 
 Affiliated mortgage lenders 2.5427*** 3.9879*** 1.6538*** 1.5155*** 
  (5.0992) (8.2475) (5.6750) (4.7852) 
 Misc lenders 1.0749 2.4814*** 1.4077** 1.3587** 
  (0.4656) (3.7494) (2.3117) (2.1966) 
Mortgage amount     
 Log mortgage amt   1.4738*** 1.5338*** 
    (13.9356) (16.7742) 
Borrower observable risk     
 CLTV   58.9151*** 50.5540*** 
    (24.4874) (24.4020) 
 Origination FICO   0.9938*** 0.9945*** 
    (-20.1116) (-15.6915) 
 Low or no doc flag   1.5355*** 1.4651*** 
    (9.2688) (9.1644) 
 Back-end DTI   1.0011 1.0017* 
    (1.0933) (1.7962) 
Product type     
 Fixed rate mtg   0.7209*** 0.1209*** 
    (-5.7366) (-7.9220) 
Contract terms     
 Negam flag   1.2530** 1.9955*** 
    (2.4901) (8.8159) 
 IO flag   1.2172*** 1.1957*** 
    (4.1579) (3.9078) 
 Prepay flag   1.1597** 1.0985** 
    (2.4579) (2.1272) 
Pricing     
 Initial interest rate    1.1209*** 
     (7.1847) 
 Fixed rate mtg*initial rate    1.3241*** 
     (12.9751) 
 Margin over ARM index    0.9925 
     (-0.5814) 
Macroeconomic characteristics     
 Log tract 2000 med inc  0.6486*** 0.6837*** 0.6854*** 
   (-6.1155) (-7.0098) (-6.7972) 
 Freddie 30-year rate  0.9466 1.0501 0.9110** 
   (-1.4470) (1.2427) (-2.0974) 
 Fed funds rate  1.2437*** 1.1861*** 1.1570*** 
   (6.7046) (5.3268) (4.8952) 
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 Regional home prices  0.1023*** 0.1249*** 0.1297*** 
   (-21.8502) (-21.5806) (-21.0024) 
 State-level unemployment  1.0514*** 1.0688*** 1.0716*** 
   (3.3881) (4.7139) (4.9474) 
Lender characteristics     
 Log annual num loans  1.0045 0.9772 0.9850 
   (0.1074) (-0.9328) (-0.6531) 
 Lender is independent  0.7822 0.9730 0.9708 
   (-1.3412) (-0.2613) (-0.3395) 
 Public parent flag  1.3847 1.1063 1.0123 
   (1.2598) (0.6897) (0.0849) 
 Log parent assets  0.9748 0.9895 0.9940 
   (-1.2825) (-0.8744) (-0.5097) 
 Lender is bank JV  1.3052 0.8243*** 0.8334*** 
   (1.2743) (-3.0465) (-2.8400) 
 Year FE N Y Y Y 
 State FE N Y Y Y 
 Observations 211,551 211,551 211,551 211,551 
 Pseudo R-squared 0.003 0.067 0.090 0.092 
Notes: This table compares the hazard of default of mortgages issued by lender type, with homebuilders the omitted category. Column 
(1) compares unconditional hazard; Column (2) adds state and origination year fixed effects, lender and macroeconomic controls; 
Column (3) adds hard risk metrics and mortgage characteristics; and Column (4) adds pricing data. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Coefficient estimates are expressed as exponentiated (non-negative) hazard ratios, with t-statistics reported below in (). (t-
statistics are negative when the hazard ratio is less than one.) All errors are clustered by lender. ***, **, * significant at 1, 5, and 10% 
level.  
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Table 3: Hazard of mortgage default by time period. 
 Hazard Ratio 
Dependent variable:  
Mortgage default 1999-2002 2003-2004 2005-2006 2007-2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Standalone mortgage lenders 
1.0887 1.0623 1.1401 1.5023** 
 
(0.3290) (0.3849) (1.2348) (2.1561) 
Depository banks 
1.1917 0.9968 1.3582*** 1.4641** 
 
(0.7791) (-0.0179) (3.1618) (2.3605) 
Affiliated mortgage lenders  
0.9185 1.2590 1.5643*** 1.3338 
 
(-0.3786) (1.3555) (4.7859) (1.3179) 
Misc lenders 
1.0303 1.1416 1.3359** 1.7956* 
 
(0.0823) (0.3972) (2.0772) (1.7882) 
Observations  29,593  46,830 83,201 51,920 
Pseudo R-squared 0.085 0.075 0.069 0.081 
 
Notes: This table examines the relative hazard of mortgage default over time, with homebuilders as the omitted category. All models include geographic, risk, 
contract and pricing controls from Table 2, Column (4), as well as state and year fixed effects. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Coefficient estimates are 
expressed as exponentiated (non-negative) hazard ratios, with t-statistics reported below in (). (t-statistics are negative when the hazard ratio is less than one.) All 
errors are clustered by lender. ***, **, * significant at 1, 5, and 10% level.   
 
 
31 
 
Table 4: Median housing (land purchase, improvement and construction) cash flows relative to mortgage unit  
 
 Median housing cash flow / firm net income 
Median mortgage unit cash 
flow / firm net income 
Median mortgage unit cash flow 
/ housing cash flow  
All years 1.2697 0.0348 0.0518  
1999 1.3519 0.2569 0.1198  
2000 1.5346 0.0681 0.0534  
2001 0.8864 0.3239 0.2164  
2002 0.8600 0.3276 0.3573  
2003 0.8933 0.0572 0.0658  
2004 1.1886 0.0300 0.0018  
2005 1.4419 0.0388 0.0349  
2006 1.9384 0.0696 0.0432  
2007 -0.3169 0.0000 -0.0887  
2008 - - -  
2009 - - -  
 
Note: Cash flow / net income is calculated as a two-year rolling measure and is set to 0 for negative net income years (therefore, 0 for all firms in 2008 
and 2009). Data includes all public homebuilders for which information was available in 10-K filings: Centex, DR Horton, Hovnanian, Lennar, MDC, 
Pulte, Standard Pacific and Tousa. Top column is not two-year smoothed, but annual calculations. 
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Table 5: Mortgage-holding capacity and hazard of mortgage default 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  Homebuilders Standalone mortgage lenders Depository banks 
Affiliated  
mortgage lenders 
      
Mortgage holding period     
 Mean (days) 19.12 28.46 44.41 61.13 
 St dev 8.65 3.82 20.02 18.14 
 # (firms) 15 5 42 15 
Pricing R-squared     
 Mean 0.61 0.67 0.53 0.49 
 St dev 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.17 
 # (firms) 29 114 79 37 
      
Panel B: Hazard of mortgage default, 2005-2006 
 Hazard Ratio 
Dependent variable:  
Mortgage default (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mortgage holding period  1.0072*** 1.0064***    1.0069*** 
  (3.2391) (2.7460)    (3.0806) 
Pricing R-squared     0.4753*** 0.5794** 0.4194** 
     (-3.0072) (-2.2467) (-2.5066) 
Standalone mortgage lenders 1.0910  0.9512 1.1502  1.1536 0.8265 
 (0.6096)  (-0.3806) (1.3078)  (1.3266) (-1.0292) 
Depository banks 1.2767*  1.0267 1.3635***  1.2876*** 0.9857 
 (1.7854)  (0.1847) (3.2111)  (2.7831) (-0.1114) 
Affiliated mortgage lenders 1.4644***  1.1551 1.6225***  1.5015*** 1.0476 
 (2.6615)  (0.8917) (4.7484)  (4.1243) (0.2283) 
Observations 53,665 53,665 53,665 73,662 73,662 73,662 52,290 
Pseudo R-squared 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.069 0.069 0.070 0.086 
 Notes: “Miscellaneous lenders” category has been omitted because no data could be gathered on these lenders for this analysis. All models include 
geographic, risk, contract and pricing controls from Table 2, Column (4), as well as state and year fixed effects. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Coefficient estimates are expressed as exponentiated (non-negative) hazard ratios, with t-statistics reported below in (). (t-statistics are 
negative when the hazard ratio is less than one.) All errors are clustered by lender. ***, **, * significant at 1, 5, and 10% level.   
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Table 6: Information tests 
Dependent variable:  
Mortgage default Hazard Ratio 
 Customer   Geography 
Risk measure: FICO CLTV Interest rate  Peak to trough 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) 
Homebuilder 0.7106*** 0.3729*** 0.6542***  0.4642*** 
 (-2.9753) (-6.0065) (-3.1998)  (-4.2783) 
Homebuilder*second quartile 0.9890 1.7418*** 1.0546  1.3961** 
 (-0.2045) (4.8769) (0.9600)  (2.0904) 
Homebuilder*third quartile 1.0338 1.8280*** 1.0717  1.5771*** 
 (0.5693) (5.5969) (1.1892)  (3.0437) 
Homebuilder*top quartile (most risky) 1.0658 1.8742*** 0.9520  1.4511** 
 (0.4753) (5.2421) (-0.4328)  (2.1663) 
Second quartile  1.5699*** 1.3320*** 0.9346  1.3129*** 
 (13.8014) (4.5173) (-1.4814)  (3.6666) 
Third quartile 1.9029*** 1.9943*** 1.2444***  2.7452*** 
 (14.8604) (9.8727) (4.2615)  (13.1953) 
Top quartile (most risky) 2.5391*** 3.0934*** 2.0622***  2.7414*** 
 (13.5234) (17.2388) (8.2427)  (12.2932) 
Observations 72,052 83,201 83,201  83,201 
Pseudo R-squared 0.067 0.064 0.064   0.061 
Notes: FICO quartiles are reverse-scored, so that Top quartile refers to the lowest (riskiest) quartile of FICO scores. Peak to trough 
is a measure of the difference between the peak home prices in a given county and the subsequent trough, from home price indices 
calculated by the author by using chained sales within each county in the dataset. Column (1) excludes mortgages with missing FICO 
scores. All models include geographic, risk, contract and pricing controls from Table 2, Column (4), as well as state and year fixed 
effects. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Coefficient estimates are expressed as exponentiated (non-negative) hazard ratios, 
with t-statistics reported below in (). (t-statistics are negative when the hazard ratio is less than one.) All errors are clustered by 
lender. ***, **, * significant at 1, 5, and 10% level.   
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Table 7: Foreclosure externality tests by quartile 
 Hazard Ratio 
  Lending order (reverse-coded) Lending density  
Construction order 
(reverse-coded) 
Construction 
density 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Homebuilder 0.7686*** 0.5523*** 0.6638*** 0.6449*** 
 (-3.0622) (-3.1973) (-4.4360) (-5.2676) 
Homebuilder*second quartile 0.9142 1.3796* 0.9907 1.0770 
 (-1.5310) (1.8183) (-0.1505) (0.7595) 
Homebuilder*third quartile 0.9190 1.5078** 1.0249 1.0320 
 (-1.1876) (2.3464) (0.3990) (0.4710) 
Homebuilder*top quartile (most externalities) 0.9242 1.4922** 1.0983 1.0369 
 (-0.8958) (2.1267) (1.2019) (0.3355) 
Second quartile 1.0302 0.8969** 0.9609 1.1204* 
 (0.8758) (-2.4448) (-0.9941) (1.7678) 
Third quartile 1.0463 0.8476** 0.9498 0.9227 
 (1.0270) (-2.2910) (-1.4379) (-1.6301) 
Top quartile (most externalities) 1.0708 0.7314*** 0.9754 0.9479 
  (0.9948) (-5.1679) (-0.5155) (-1.0334) 
Observations 82,996 82,996 51,294 51,294 
Pseudo R-squared 0.069 0.069 0.072 0.072 
Notes: Lending order refers to the order of loans issued by a lender within a census block group (as a measure of future 
foreclosure risk), and has been reverse-coded so that higher quartiles refer to earlier lending (and, hence, greater potential 
externalities). Lending density refers to the number of loans by a given lender within a census block group (a measure of loans 
exposed to foreclosure costs). Construction order refers to the order of construction by a homebuilder within a census block 
group (as a measure of future foreclosure risk) , and has been reverse-coded so that higher quartiles refer to earlier construction 
(and, hence, greater potential externalities). Construction density refers to the number of homes constructed by a homebuilder 
within a census block group (measure of number of homes exposed to foreclosure costs). Specifications using these measures 
include only homes constructed by homebuilders with in-house lenders and compare in-house loans versus loans made by outside 
lenders. All models include geographic, risk, contract and pricing controls from Table 2, Column (4), as well as state and year 
fixed effects and include mortgages issued between 2005 and 2006. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Coefficient 
estimates are expressed as exponentiated (non-negative) hazard ratios, with t-statistics reported below in (). (t-statistics are 
negative when the hazard ratio is less than one.) All errors are clustered by lender. ***, **, * significant at 1, 5, and 10% level.  
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 Appendix A -- Variable definitions 
Variable Definition Source
Notice of default A notice filed in the county public record that the borrower has 
officially defaulted on the mortgage. This notice is considered 
the first step in foreclosure proceedings. 
Public records 
Sale amt ($) Sale price appearing on the recording document Public records 
Mtg amt ($) Amount of the mortgage, first-lien only Public records 
Initial interest rate Original or initial interest rate as of the loan's first payment date Servicing db 
Margin Basis points added to the ARM index to determine the coupon 
rate of the ARM loan 
Servicing db 
CLTV Ratio of the first- and second-lien amount to the sale price? of 
the house at the time of purchase 
Public records 
FICO FICO (credit) score of borrower at time of loan origination Servicing db 
Low or no documentation Indicator equal to one if loan documentation was not complete Servicing db 
Back-end DTI The total monthly liabilities of the borrower, including the debt 
on the subject property, divided by the total monthly income of 
the borrower(s) 
Servicing db 
Adjustable rate mortgage 
(ARM) 
Indicator equal to one if mortgage rate is determined by a 
spread over a floating index 
Servicing db 
Fixed rate mortgage 
(FRM) 
Indicator equal to one if mortgage rate is determined by a fixed 
coupon rate 
Servicing db 
Negative amortization Indicator equal to one if mortgage has a provision that allows 
monthly payments below the interest coverage amount, rolling 
the difference into the principal balance 
Servicing db 
Interest only Indicator equal to one if mortgage has provision that allows 
monthly payments to cover only interest owed, rather than 
interest plus amortization of the loan balance 
Servicing db 
Prepayment penalty Indicator equal to one if mortgage has provision that assesses a 
penalty to the borrower if a loan is prepaid 
Servicing db 
Log tract 2000 med inc Median income of households within a census tract in 2000 Census 
Freddie 30-yr rate Interest rate for 30-year fixed mortgages published by Freddie 
Mac 
Freddie Mac 
Fed Funds rate The interest rate at which depository institutions trade balances 
held at the Federal Reserve 
Federal Reserve 
Regional home prices A home price index at the county level constructed from the 
mortgages in this dataset 
Public records 
State-level 
unemployment 
Quarterly state unemployment rates Bureau Labor Statistics 
Log annual number loans Log of the number of loans originated by each lender within this 
dataset 
Public records 
Lender independent Indicator equal to one if lender does not have a parent company Researcher 
Parent public Indicator equal to one if parent company is publicly traded Compustat 
Parent log assets Log of the parent assets if parent company is publicly traded Compustat 
Lender JV with bank Indicator equal to one if homebuilder’s lending unit is a joint 
venture with a financial firm  
Various 
